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1 Introduction
Efficient wage-labor bargaining models usually assume that the employment level
be measured in terms of aggregate working hours of the workers in the union.
The implicit assumption behind this approach is that given the average working
hours of a worker, the firm and the union bargain over the number of employment
and the wage rate. But, as observed in Oswald [11], often both the firm and the
labor union take the number of the workers granted and then bargain over the
working hours per worker, rather than the aggregate hours worked collectively by
the variable number of workers. After the settlement of the working hours per
head and the wage rate, the firm can adjust the number of employment by hiring
or dismissing workers for the next term. Though the unions certainly have some
measures to counter the dismissal, actual firms retain the eventual right to determine
the number of the employment, and they would even bankrupt if the payment of the
wage becomes impossible. These considerations naturally lead us to the notion of
two-stage decision making of the firm, in which the firm predetermines the number
of employment and then bargains over wage and working hours.
The purpose of this paper is to formalize a bargaining model which reflects this
two stage decision making process by a firm in a single period of production. The
most natural way to capture this is through the use of extensive form representation
of the decision making process by the firm: the firm as the first mover decides the
number of the employment which preconditions the bargaining process to follow.
This process allows the firm to select a level of employment in its favor to influence
the result of the bargaining, so that the “sub-game perfect” solution is obtained
when the firm optimizes its decision. If this is the case, the eventual wage rate
and the hours worked per worker become functions of the number of the employ-
ment. The optimal profit maximizing level of the employment should be obtained
by backward induction and the final results should be settled accordingly.
These final results are indeed under the influence of economic environment sur-
rounding the firm and the workers. One of the most important component of the
environment is the demand condition of the product of the firm. The price level of
the product represents general business conditions and is of great interest for the
firm. If we think the firm is a representative of the macro economy, then the price
represents the general price level and this also is of great interest to the workers.
The model developed below is similar in spirit to that of “seniority model” of
Oswald [11] who developed, among other things, a model of efficient bargaining over
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the wage rate and the level of the effort of a worker. However, our model differs
essentially from that of Oswald in that the firm maximizes its profit explicitly
with respect to the employment level, knowing the effect of the level on the agreed
outcome of the bargaining. To our knowledge, Moene [10] is the first to incorporate
this “strategic commitment” element in the wage bargaining model. In his model,
the firm and the worker negotiate over the wage rate alone and the firm holds full
freedom to determine the employment level, assuming the employment coincides
with the labor input. In contrast, we take the level of the employment as given and
consider the bargaining of both the wage rates and the working hours worked per
worker. As shown below, the approach of Moene is justified in our framework in the
sense that the optimal working hour are always the same. We also explicitly consider
the disutility of the labor, which allows natural interpretation of the bargaining
outcomes and plays an important rôle in the determination of the outcome.
2 The Model
The model is relatively simple. There is a competitive firm and a union within
the firm. The firm produces its product with the labor input. The number of
the employment is determined by the firm unilaterally. The (standard) working
hours per worker and the rate of wage per hour are determined through collective
bargaining.
The labor is totally unionized. The firm and the union agree on the common
standard working hour l among the union members and they both observe this
agreement. We assume the workers are homogeneous with respect to their individual
labor input. To capture the effect of working hours on the level of production, we
assume that the effective labor input per head per hour generally vary with the
length of the working hours. So, let k(l) be the effective labor input produced by a
worker with l hours of labor. We assume,
k(0) = 0, k′(l) > 0, k′′(l) ≤ 0,
that is, the longer the worker works, the lesser, or unchanged, her marginal con-
tribution per hour to the effective labor will be. This captures the often claimed
“inefficiently long work” and seems fairly natural, at least above some short period,
due to the exhaustion from the work. 1
Let L be the effective level of total labor input and N the number of the em-
1See, for example, Booth and Ravallion [4].
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ployment. Assuming the total effective labor is purely additive with respect to the
individual effective labor, we have,
L = Nk(l). (1)
Let f(L) be the production function of the firm. As usual, the marginal product








Note that in our construction, the marginal product of an increase in the man-hour





(N − 1)k(l0) + k(l)
]
|l=l0= k′(l0)f ′(Nk(l0)).
The total marginal product of an increase in the agreed working hour l is simply




We can now define the firm’s profit as,
π = pf(Nk(l)) − Nwl, (2)
where w is the wage rate per hour per head and p the (competitive) price of the
product.
The firm has utility function v(π) and is risk-averse with respect to its profit:
v′(π) > 0, v′′(π) < 0.
We assume the union is indifferent in the level of (un)employment. This as-
sumption may be justified in several ways, the most persuasive of which may be the
“seniority model” of Oswald [11]. Then, the union’s interest consists in the wage
rate and the working hours but not in the level of employment. This assumption
implies that the objective of the union coincides with the objective of its individual
working, or senior, members.
Let D(l) be the disutility in monetary terms of l hours of labor for a worker.
The disutility and the marginal disutility are strictly increasing with working hours:
D(0) = 0, D′(l) > 0, D′′(l) > 0.
The total monetary value x derived from the labor l for a worker is then,
x = wl − D(l). (3)
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The utility level of a woker is a fuction of this monetary value x. Let u(x) be the
utility function. As usual, the workers are risk-averse:
u′(x) > 0, u′′(x) < 0.
To perform the analysis on the bargaining, we need further specifications on
the utility functions of both parties. First, we define reservation payoffs x̄ and π̄,
guaranteed to the parties involved. When the union and the firm have not reached
an agreement, individual workers would receive satisfaction x̄ in monetary terms,
and the firm its profit π̄. The reservation utilities derived therefrom are simply u(x̄)
and v(π̄).
Second, following Aumann and Kurz [2] and Aoki [1], we assume constant global
boldness on both u and v. For a worker, this implies the utility function becomes
an affine transformation of the form (x− x̄)α. Without loss of generality, we simply
suppose the transformation to be the identity transformation:
u(x) = (x − x̄)α, α > 0. (4)
Similarly, we assume
v(π) = (π − π̄)β , β > 0. (5)
By definition, reservation utility ū of the union and v̄ of the firm are both equal to
zero: 2
ū = (x̄ − x̄)α = 0, v̄ = (π̄ − π̄)β = 0.
Given a level of employment, the rate of wage and the working hours are deter-
mined through collective bargaining between the firm and the union. The level of
the employment itself is determined by the firm acting as a Stackelberg leader by
backward induction. We assume that the elasticity of the supply of the manpower is
zero, and there always are unemployed workers available to the firm in the economy
as a whole. For the bargaining to be well–defined, the number of the employment
must be determined beforehand. Otherwise, the employment itself must be at stake
on the bargaining table.
The economic variables to be determined in this model are: 1.) the rate of wage
w, 2.) the working hours per worker l, and 3.) the level of employment N . The
variables representing the economic environment are: 1.) the price of the product
2We can still perform comparative statics with respect to the reservation payoffs x̄ and v̄, whose
economic implications are to be given elsewhere.
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p, 2.) the reserved profit π̄, and 3.) the reserved payoff to a worker x̄. Each of
those latter three variables serves as a business parameter in our model. They
are expected to be positively correlated in real economy, but we treat them to be
mutually independent.
3 The Nash Bargaining Solution
Given the level of the employment N , the Nash bargaining solution is obtained by
maximizing the Nash product:
max
(l.w)
(w − D(l) − x̄)α (π − π̄)β . (6)
As a necessary condition for the solution, we have,
pf ′(Nk(l))k′(l) − D′(l) = 0. (7)
This equation simply requires that the marginal value product of individual working
hour be equal to the marginal disutility of the working hour. Note that (7) doesn’t
depend on the value of the wage rate.
Differentiating the left-hand side of the equation (7) with respect to l, we have,
p{f ′(Nk(l))k′′(l) + f ′′(Nk(l))Nk′(l)2} − D′′(l) < 0. (8)
Therefore, only from the equation (7), we have the agreed working hours l at the
Nash bargaining solution as an implicit function of the employment N and the
product price p:
l = l(N, p). (9)
The solution value of the wage rate is
w =













is the relative boldness (or the relative bargaining power, depending on the in-
terepretations) of the union. The denominator in the second expression of (10) is
simply the total real labor input, and the numerator is a weighted average, with
the relative boldness as the weight, of the surplus revenue of the firm and the net
aggregate monetary disutility of the workers in the union. This is equivalent to the
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weighted average of the average surplus revenue for the firm from the total physical
labor input, and the average net disutility of a worker from her own labor, as shown
in the rightmost expression.
By simply substituting l(N, p) for l in (10), we have the wage rate w at the
bargaining solution as an implicit function of N and p:
w = w(N, p). (11)
The profit π of the firm at the solution is
π = (1 − θ) {pf(Nk(l)) − (D(l) + x̄)N} + θπ̄. (12)
Rewriting this, we have
π − π̄ = (1 − θ) {pf(Nk(l)) − (D(l) + x̄)N − π̄} , (13)
which is the net gain of the firm from the bargaining.




{pf(Nk(l)) − (D(l) + x̄)N − π̄} + x̄. (14)
And the net monetary gain x − x̄ accrued to a worker is
x − x̄ = θ
N
{pf(Nk(l)) − (D(l) + x̄)N − π̄} . (15)







Thus, at the Nash bargaing solution, θ also represents the share of the net surplus
gain obtained by the union from the bargaing, relative to that of the firm.
At this point, we note that the inequality
(pf(Nk(l)) − π̄) − (D(l) + x̄)N = (π − π̄) + (x − x̄)N > 0 (17)
must hold for the Nash bargaining solution. The analysis on this value is performed
in Section 7.
At the end of this section, we analyze the effect of the employment and the
product price on the Nash bargaining solution (l, w) = (l(N, p), w(N, p)). The
results serve as preliminaries to the later analyses.
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p{f ′(Nk(l))k′′(l) + f ′′(Nk(l))Nk′(l)2} − D′′(l)
> 0. (19)
Thus, the agreed working hours become shorter when the employment is increased,
and it becomes longer when the product price becomes higher.
To calculate the effect of the employment and the price on the agreed wage
rate, we first have to differentiate (10) with respect to the working hour l, to the
employment N and to the price p, to obtain
Γl =
θ(pf ′(Nk(l))k′(l)Nl − pf(Nk(l)) + π̄)
Nl2
+












Whereas the sign of Γp is positive, the signs of Γl and ΓN are both ambiguous. 3














The singns are both ambiguous due to the ambiguity of Γl and ΓN .
4 Profit Maximization
Knowing the result of the Nash bargaining solution, the firm maximizes its profit
(12) with respect to the employment N . Differentiating (12) with respect to N and
letting the derivative equal to zero, we have from 0 < θ < 1 and (7),
pf ′(Nk(l(N, p)))k(l(N, p)) − (D(l(N, p)) + x̄) = 0. (23)
It is easy to verify that the profit function (12) is strictly concave with respect to the
employment N under our assumptions. The decision making process of the firm is
as follows. For an employment level N , the firm correctly anticipates the rule, or the
3In the case of ΓN , if π̄ ≤ 0, the sign is negative, due to the strict concavity of f(Nk(l)) with
respect to l. And in the profit maximizing level of the employment, it is also negative. See the
proof of Proposition 2 below.
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“reaction function,” l = l(N, p) governing the working hours at the Nash bargaining
solution. According to the rule, the firm sets its profit maximizing employment level
satisfying the conditon (23). Since the profit function is strictly concave with respect
to N , the solution of the profit maximization problem is unique.
The strict concavity and the smoothness of the profit function also imply that
the optimal employment level N becomes an implicit function of the product price
p. We write this optimal value as
N = N(p).
The rate of wage w = w(N, p) also becomes a function of the product price only.
Abusing the symbols, we define
w(p) = w(N(p), p).
We can also reduce the resultant working hours to a function of the product price
only: l = l(N(p), p). We now show that the value of the working hour l∗ satisfying
the equation (23) must be unique, giving the constant function l(N(p), p) = l∗.




− (D(l) + x̄) = 0. (24)
Note that k(l)/k′(l) ≥ l by the concavity and k(0) = 0, and that D′(l)l > D(l)
by the strict convexity and D(0) = 0. This implies if the union has non-positive
reservation at the bargaining, that is, if x̄ ≤ 0, the equation (24) never holds and
the profit maximization problem of the firm cannot have a solution. If this were
the case, the firm would try to employ as much workers as possible, since the
marginal profit of the manpower expressed in the lefthand side of (23) should be
always positive. Therefore, we assume hereafter that the union’s reservation payoff
is strictly positive:
x̄ > 0. (25)
The left hand side of (24) is strictly increasing with respect to the working hour
l, so that the value l∗ satisfying it is, if ever exists, 4 uniquely determined. A
rather surprising conclusion from this observation is that the working hour at the
maximum profit level is, among others, inelastic to the price level:
4Several economically natural conditions guarantee the existence of the optimal solution.
Though the usual compactness argument cannot fit well into the model, the assumption of un-
bounded marginal utility, with several additional conditions, would be sufficient for the existence.
In particular, if we set a physical limit l̄ of the working hours, the domain of the disutility function
becomes a bounded left semi-closed interval [0, l̄) and the marginal disutility is expected to diverge
as l approaches l̄.
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Proposition 1 The working hour l∗ at the maximum profit level of the firm is,
if ever exists, uniquely determined by the effectiveness of working hour k(l), the
disutility function D(l) and the reservation payoff x̄ to a worker. It doesn’t depend
on the price level p. Neither does it depend on the production function f(L), nor
the parameters π̄ and θ of the reserved profit and the relative boldness. ¥
What is implied in Proposition 1 is that given the reservation payoff x̄ to a worker, to
maximize the profit at whatever price level p, the firm only has to set its employment
N at such level that it induces the l∗ of working hours at the collective bargaining.
That level of employment gives exactly N(p).







which requires that the elasticity of the effectiveness of the working hour be equal
to the elasiticity of the disutility D(l) plus the constant reservation payoff x̄ to a
worker.





(1 − θ){x̄ + D(l∗)}
l∗
, (27)










In the case of k(l) = l, the wage rate in (28) is reduced to a weighted average of the
average value product of the total real labor input and the marginal value product
of per head input of the working hours, less the markdown by the average reserved
profit. This is a well known result in Mcdonald and Solow [9], and the following
proposition holds:
Proposition 2 The following inequalities hold for the wage rate w(p) at the profit





> w(p) > pk′(l∗)f ′(Nk∗). (29)
In the verbal expression:
1. The per hour wage rate at the maximum profit exceeds the per head marginal
value product of working hour.
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2. If π̄ ≥ 0, the wage rate falls short of the average value product of the total real
labor input.
Proof. By definition, the Nash bargaining solution at a successful bargaining re-
quires that the eventual gains π and x be strictly larger than the reserved gains π̄
and x̄. Thus, we have
pf(Nk) − Nwl > π̄ and wl − D(l) > x̄.
The former expression immediately leads to the first inequality in (29). At the
maximum profit level, we also know from (23) that D(l∗) + x̄ = pf ′(Nk∗)k∗, so









f ′(Nk∗) ≥ pk′(l∗)f ′(Nk∗),
which is the second inequality in (29). ¥
So, if the firm expects at least break–even condition as the minimum on the profit in
its production plan, the resultant wage rate will be between the per head marginal
value product of working hour and the average product of the total real labor input.
Using (27), we obtain the maximized profit π = π(p) and the payoff x = x(p) to
a worker at the maximized profit as





− (D(l∗) + x̄)
}
. (32)
Welfare implications of these expressions are discussed in Section 7.
5 The Effect of the Price Change
This section is dedicated to the analysis of the change in the price as a parameter.
This is one of the most important business parameters and, in principle, can be
easily observed.
In the analysis that follows, we don’t make distinction between nominal and
deflated value of the product price. That kind of distinction in this general setup
makes the definitions of the wage rate and the payoff to the workers somewhat
ambiguous without additional assumptions. By not doing so, we leave the room for
the interpretation of the analysis.
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5.1 The Employment
As we have reduced the employment demand of the firm to a function of the product
price N = N(p), the first thing to do is to investigate the effect of the price change
on the employment. It’s one of the most fundamental concerns in macroeconomics,
both theoretically and empirically.
We know the function l(N, p) in (9) takes constant value l∗ at profit maximizing
level of N , so that the optimal employment level N = N(p) must satisfy the equation
l(N, p) = l∗. Differentiating N implicitly with respect to p in the equation l(N, p) =
l∗, we have the following results:











As usual, with a profit maximizing competitive firm(in the sense that it is a price
taker of its product), a boom in the product expands the demand for the employ-
ment and a depression shrinks it.







This value is positive by Propostion 3.
In the production side, a rise in the product price works normally for this com-
petitive firm. That is, from Proposition 3, it follows that;
Proposition 4 1. Both total real labor input Nl and the total effective labor

























Let us now consider Cobb–Douglas type production function and assume the
effective working hour is proportionate to the physical working hour:













Thus, the price elasticity of the employment is constant and larger than unity. This
point is further examined later.
5.2 The Wage Rate
Our intuition tells that the wage rate moves toward the same direction as the prod-
uct price and there are numerous empirical works on this issue5. Straightforward
















General condition on the sign of (39) can be given as follows. Consider the pro-
duction function g(N) = f(Nk∗) of employment N as its only argument. Then,
g′(N) = k∗f ′(Nk∗) and g(N) is strictly concave and g(0) = 0. A little calculation
reveals that the the sign of the effect of the price change on the wage rate is re-
lated to the relative magnitude of the price elasticity of the employment ηN , to the






, (y = g(N) = f(Nk∗)) (40)
and to the proportion of the reserved profit π̄ to the revenue of the firm R = pf(Nk∗)




T 0 as εyN +
π̄
R








Note also that the strict concavity of g(N) = f(Nk∗) and g(0) = 0 imply 0 < εyN < 1
for any N > 0. On the other hand, for the bargaining to be successful, the revenue
5See for example, Blanchflower et al. [3], Hildreth and Oswald [7] and the literature cited there.
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of the firm R = pf(Nk∗) must exceed the reserved profit π̄, so that their proportion





But to give a sufficient condition for the wage rate to increase with the price, we have
to give a lower, rather than upper, bound of εyN + π̄/R. We know the price elasticity
of the employment is positive and since the employment elasticity of production εyN
and the revenue of the firm R are both positive, we have:
Proposition 6 1. The combination of relatively large employment elasticity of
production and relatively large reserved profit may imply the wage rate increas-




> 1 =⇒ dw(p)
dp
> 0. (42)
2. If the price elasticity of the employment ηN is less than 1, and if the reserved
profit π̄ is non-negative, the wage rate increases with the price:





Unfortunately, Cobb–Douglas production function of the type (37) doesn’t sat-
isfy either condition in Proposition 6 even when π̄ ≥ 0. As we have already seen,
the price elasticity of the employment is larger than 1 for this production function,






Since 0 < γ < 1, we have,
Proposition 7 If the production function and the effective working hour take the
forms in (37), the effect of an increase in the price on the wage rate takes the
opposite sign to the reserved profit π̄, and if in addition π̄ = 0, the wage rate is
inelastic to the product price. ¥
When the product price of the firm with Cobb–Douglas technology falls and if the
firm expects and sticks to the break-even condition as guaranteed in the failure of
the bargaining, both the working hours and the wage rate will be unchanged under
this price downfall, meaning the firm reacts to this recession in its business by merely
contracting the volume of its employment. That is, highly elastic employment to
the price will be accompanied by sticky nominal wage rate and sticky working hours.
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Note also that by (38), the price elasticity of the employment itself is constant in
this case, so that if the firm expects positive minimum profit at the failure of the
bargaining under recession, unemployment accompanied by a rising wage rate will
result.
As we have analyzed the effects of the price on both the employment and the
wage rate, we can easily derive the effects on the profit and the gains to the workers.
Proposition 8 1. The profit increases with the competitive product price:
dπ
dp
= (1 − θ)f(Nk∗) > 0. (44)
2. The direction of the change in the gain to the workers induced by an increase








As expected, an increase in the price of the product improves the profit of the firm,
whereas the direction of the impact on the welfare of the union members depends
on the movement of the wage rate, because the working hours are inelastic to the
price. As a whole, if dw(p)/dp ≥ 0, a boom in the product of the firm is surely
Pareto improving for both parties, otherwise it only benefits the firm.
6 The Effect of Other Parameters
In this section, we consider other parameters than the price level, namely the re-
served gains π̄ and x̄ and the distributional parameter θ. Unlike the product price,
those variables are difficult to observe. Nontheless, there are several theoretically
interesting results and we pick up some of those. We only consider the effects on
the economic variables at profit maximizing level.
First note that from Proposition 1, neither the reserved profit of the firm π̄ nor
the distributional parameter θ have any effect on the profit maximizing working hour
l∗. Together with the condition (24), they don’t affect the level of the employment
either.
Other than the price p, the reserved payoff x̄ to a worker is the only economic
variable to influence the level of the profit maximizing working hours l∗. The effect
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D′′ − pf ′k′′
> 0. (46)
Thus, if the union expects larger reserved payoff at the bargaining table, their
eventual working hours are increased, probably against their will.
To consider the effect of the reserved payoff x̄ on the employment, take the
equation
Q(N, l∗) = l(N, p) − l∗ = 0,
which expresses the relationship of the profit maximizing emloyment and the profit
maximizing working hours at the Nash bargaining solution for a given price level.
From (18), we have ∂Q/∂N = ∂l(N, p)/∂N < 0 and we can use implicit function

















If we take, somewhat inconsistently with our assumptions, the reserved payoff to
the workers as a subjective business parameter, this result implies that it acts as
a stabilizer for the (un)employment in the business cycle. This is typical for the
collective bargaining models.
For the effect of x̄ on the wage rate w, first consider the wage income of a worker
wl∗. Suppressing the arguments, the result is:
d(wl∗)
dx̄






















The sign is ambiguous here.
All in all, however, the payoff x = wl − D(l) to a worker is surely improved by










6Note that the expression pf − D − x̄ − π̄ = (π − π̄) + (x − x̄) + (N − 1)wl∗ must be positive





= (θ − 1)N < 0. (51)
Thus, when the workers’ reserved payoff rises, the workers gain more at the cost of
the firm.
As can be seen from (27) and elsewhere, the reserved profit π̄ has its direct and
indirect impact on the determination and the behavior of the wage rate. The direct






The interpretation is easy. The negative value of this derivative is simply the distri-
butional weight put on the firm’s surplus revenue in the determination of the wage
rate(see (27)), meaning the proportion of the revenue allocated to the per hour per
head wage has been absorbed by the increased reserved profit, by the distributional
coefficient expressed above.
For the profit and the payoff to a worker, we have as expected,
dπ
dπ̄







Here again, we have the expected result that the firm gains more at the cost of the
workers when the firm’s reserved payoff rises.
The distributional parameter θ has its impact on the firm and the union through




pf − π̄ − (D + x̄)N
l∗N
=
(π − π̄) + N(x − x̄)
l∗N
> 0. (55)
The interpretation of the numerater here is given in the next Section.
For the profit and the payoff to the workers, we have,
dπ
dθ




pf − π̄ − (D + x̄)N
l∗
=
(π − π̄) + N(x − x̄)
l∗
> 0. (57)
7 Some Welfare Implications
In the previous sections, we have already referred to several welfare implications
concerning the changes in the economic environment. In this section, we examine
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welfare implications of our model in terms of its total economic welfare and the
distribution of the total product.
First, define total surplus S as the sum of the surplus gains to the firm and the
union as a whole:
S(N, l) = (π − π̄) + N(x − x̄)
= pf(Nk(l)) − π̄ − N(D(l) + x̄).
(58)
As we have already seen, S must be positive at the Nash bargaining solution. We
can verify S(N, l) is strictly concave over economically relevant convex set of (N, l)
plain.
Differentiation of S with respect to the working hour l yields
∂S
∂l
= N(pk′(l)f ′(Nk(l)) − D′(l)). (59)
Since S is strictly concave, if S has a maximum, keeping the other things being
equal, with respect to the working hour l, it’s uniquely determined. Necessary and
sufficient condition for the interior maximum is, indeed,
pk′(l)f ′(Nk(l)) − D′(l) = 0.
Given N and p, this is exactly the condition (7) for the Nash bargaining solution.
Moreover, differentiating S with respect to the employment N , we have
∂S
∂N
= pk(l)f ′(Nk(l)) − (D(l) + x̄). (60)
Again, other things being equal, if there is a maximum with respect to N , it’s
uniquly determined. The condition is now
pk(l)f ′(Nk(l)) − (D(l) + x̄) = 0.
Given p and x̄, this is exactly the condition (23) for the profit maximization at the
Nash bargaining solution. Thus we have:
Proposition 9 The profit maximizing pair (N(p), l∗) defined in Section 4, if ever
exists, maximizes S(N, l) over any economically meaningful convex domain C con-
taining (N(p), l∗) in its interior in (N, l) plain. ¥
At the profit maximization level of the employment, we have from (31) and (32),






From Proposition 9 and the equations above, we can easily derive several results in






{(1 − θ)(S(N, l) + π̄)} = (1 − θ)f(Nk). (N = N(p), k = k∗)
We have already seen that a rise in the price is Pareto improving if and only if







= f(Nk∗) > 0. (63)
This is indeed the ratio of the nominal increase to the price in the value added of
the total product induced by the price pickup, which is to be distributed between
the firm and the workers. As has been shown above, the firm’s profit increases by












= θf(Nk) > 0. (N = N(p), k = k∗)
(64)
Again, θ works as the distributional proportion to the union. Along with the result
of (45), this reveals that if dw(p)/dp < 0 and thus dx/dp < 0, the decrease in the
gain x (or actual payment wl∗) to a worker is due to the increased employment N
and not to the decrease in the gain to the union as a whole. This result is, at least,





















where ηN is the price elasticity of the employment and is always positive. The
rightmost expression is broken down into two parts and they are expressed in real
terms as the ratios to the price. The first term is the per worker avergae product
multiplied by the distributional coefficient θ, showing the rate of increase in the per
worker wage income due to the increase in the aggregate gain to the union members
if the employment stayed as it was. The second term is the current payoff in real
terms multiplied by the price elasticity of the employment ηN , showing the rate of
decrease in the wage income due to the increased employment if the aggregate gain
to the union members stayed as it was.
As a whole, leaving the room for profit maximization to the firm in the de-
termination of labor input seems at least acceptable for the labor class in general
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under the boom, since the employment will be improved and the total gain will be
increased. But when the interest of the society is not on the total surplus as de-
fined above, but on the employment itself, this is probably an impediment to the
mitigation of the unemployment under depression.
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have analyzed a bargaining model where the firm holds absolute
grip over the employment. This kind of formulation is suitable for an economy
where the discretionary reaction of the firm on the labor input against business
cycle is mainly the accomodation of the employment and/or in lesser degree, of the
wage rate, rather than that of the working hours of current employees.
A somewhat unexpected result of the analysis is that under this setup, the
working hours are sticky against the price change. This leads to the more elastic
employment against the product price. Highly fluctuating employment in this setup
is in part the result of this stickiness of the working hours.
Another remarkable point in the analysis is that the firm’s reserved profit π̄ has
strong quantitative and qualitative influence on the determination and the behavior
of the wage rate. This can be clearly observed in equation (27) and Propositions 2
and 6.
On the welfare side, wage rate rising with the price implies that this price in-
crease is Pareto improving for the parties of the bargaining. In other words, the
welfare is ‘pro–cyclical’ if the wage rate rises with the price. The distribution of
the increased product to a worker is done through the wage rate, rising or falling,
whose direction of the chnage is in part determined by the level of the employment,
but not through the working hours.
We have also seen that when the firm determines its employment so as to max-
imize its profit, the total surplus function S(N, l) in Section 7 is maximized. If we
accept the index as representing the welfare of the economy as a whole, the absolute
leadership of the firm on the level of the employment is, against our intuition, rather
desirable.
The welfare implication would be clearly captured by comparing the baragining
solution with that which results from simultaneous determination of the employ-
ment. In comparing the models, there are issues not only of the separate treatment
of the employment from the labor input, but also of the assumption of ‘selfish’
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union as againt ‘altruistic’ union. The latter point is much subtler as it first ap-
pears, since in our model, the very reason the number of employment is not on
the bargaining table is that the union is indifferent in the number of employment.
These comparisons are the task to be done next.
Another task to be done is the analysis on the market equilibrium. The change
in the ‘product price’ p in this paper can be directly interpreted as the change
in the ‘total factor productitivity’ and they are indiscernible in current setup. To
distinguish the effect of the demand shocks and the supply shocks, we have to take
account of the market equilibrium. If there are easily testable differences between
them, that would be another contribution to the analysis of the labor market in
general.
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